LARS PATRICK BERG

Since 2019, Berg has served as a Deputy of the European Parliament and a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Within the Identity and Democracy Group (ID), he has held positions on the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE), and the Delegation for Relations with the Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb Union, which includes the EU-Morocco, EU-Tunisia, and EU-Algeria Joint Parliamentary Committees (DMAG). In May 2021, Berg announced his resignation from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the ID faction. From July 2021 to January 2023, Berg was affiliated with the Liberal-Conservative Reformers party. Since January 2023, he has been with the Alliance Germany party.

Question: Let's begin with the situation in Ukraine. How do you envision a future settlement among Ukraine, Russia, and key players such as Europe and the United States, with a primary focus on Ukraine and Russia? What stance should Europeans and Americans adopt? Should we be involved, and if so, how?

Answer: I believe one possibility is that this war could extend over several more years, which would arguably be among the worst outcomes for both Europe and Ukraine. As Europeans, and as part of the European Union, it's incumbent upon us to remain firm in our support for the Ukrainian people and their government. This holds true even if the next U.S. president were to be Mr. Trump. In such an event, European nations must escalate their support—financial, military, and moral. I'm deeply convinced that Ukrainians are making sacrifices on behalf of all of us, and this cannot be overlooked. Should this war prolong, it will heavily tax our societies—first and foremost Ukraine, which has been enduring this hardship for over two years, but also EU member states, notably Poland and Germany, which may face a growing number of refugees and significant financial strain in responding to Russian aggression.

While states and nations inherently have divergent interests—rarely fully aligned—we must unequivocally assert that there are red lines that cannot be crossed without a robust response. The threat of borders being contested or altered is a severe risk that we cannot stand for. This is an area where we in the European Union, and in Europe more broadly, must make considerable improvements, particularly in Germany, to fend off not just potential state-based threats from Russia, but also the likes of cyber attacks or conflicts in the southwestern part of Europe, like the Western Balkans. Our very existence hinges on our capacity to respond.

Q: Is Europe prepared to engage in actual warfare with Russia?

A: No, Europe is not ready, nor should we be aiming for such a readiness. War is desired by none. I have not personally met Mr. Putin, but I would surmise that the collapse of Russia and a threat to his governance are not in his interests. With this in mind, it's apparent that Europe must act swiftly to adhere to the requirements set forth by various U.S. administrations—specifically, the allocation of at least 2% of our national gross income to military spending. This needs to be addressed urgently through comprehensive planning and increased activity. Currently, our capabilities do not match those necessary to enter a conflict with Russia.

Q: Should Europe consider new forms of taxation on Russian resources, or adopt a more aggressive stance with sanctions?

A: There are advantages and disadvantages to such a strategy. According to my understanding, Russian oil and gas still reach the European Union via Azerbaijan and Turkey, albeit under different labels, and continue to enter our markets. This is challenging since Europe's energy dependency precludes a straightforward refusal of these imports. Imposing a limit or higher taxes on these resources would undoubtedly impact the economic well-being and overall prosperity of member states, particularly Germany. Morally, increasing taxation could be justified. From a pragmatic perspective, we must evaluate our options for replacing Russian LNG. Indeed, we do import LNG from the United States to Germany and other parts of Europe, which comes at a steep price. However, an abrupt cessation or permanent embargo on these resources seems implausible.

Q: Looking back at 2014, Russian leaders perceived European authorities as weak, which emboldened their actions. What are your thoughts on Europe's perceived weakness?

A: I concur with that assessment. You must confront such political figures (like Putin) with determination and substantial backing—verbal challenges without the support of financial resources, sanctions, and military might will be quickly seen through. Credibility comes from having a powerful voice with the resources to enforce it. If there are red lines, they need to be clear and non-negotiable. Violations must bear consequences. The European Union has been too inconsistent, allowing others to exploit our weaknesses. It is imperative that we adopt a stronger position; as a significant economic entity, the EU has the capacity to weigh heavily in such matters. We must leverage our economic strength and present a united, formidable front.

Q: Should the European Union consider revoking its recognition of Vladimir Putin's legitimacy as the president of Russia?

A: That's a challenging proposition with potential moral benefits. However, we need to contemplate the real impact such a move would have on the conduct and decisions of the Russian administration.

Q: Over the past two years, Putin's propaganda has been labeling Ukrainians as Nazis incessantly. What is your perspective on these claims, especially against the backdrop of World War II and considering your German heritage?

A: It's abhorrent. It represents a very low form of propaganda aimed at indoctrinating the Russian populace. It's particularly revolting when you consider that Ukraine’s President is of Jewish descent. To us in Europe, it is abundantly clear that these are mere propagandistic tactics, yet they also signify a profound deficiency in political discourse.

Q: Assuming a peace deal is struck and Ukraine cedes territory, how should the EU engage with Putin? Would this restore his legitimacy and status?

A: Considering the history of aggression—events in Georgia, Ukraine, Crimea, and beyond, along with Russian disinformation campaigns and belligerent foreign policy—we must adopt a staunch stance. Europe's approach to Mr. Putin and his potential successors must be resolute and stringent. This stance must be underpinned by credibility; a Europe perceived as weak militarily cannot expect to be taken seriously. Putin likely believes he can manipulate a Europe that appears feeble, reliant on the U.S., and timid. To prevent further manipulation and chaos sown through hybrid warfare and other means in regions like the Western Balkans and the Baltics, Europe must fortify its military credibility. While I don’t endorse war, we must acknowledge the danger Putin poses. Those observing from Russia's sidelines will take Europe's tepid response as a green light to test boundaries elsewhere with impunity. Hence, it is imperative for us to be consistent and project strength, not only economically and financially but also militarily.

Q: With the rise in support for Putin’s policies within Germany, and parties like AfD sympathizing with his agenda, some suggest banning AfD for its anti-immigration stance, which is deemed unconstitutional by some. As a former member, what are your thoughts on this?

A: I believe banning the AfD could be counterproductive; such actions could inadvertently boost its support. A ban is justifiable only with incontrovertible proof that the party, or a significant number of its members, seeks to undermine our democratic fabric and constitution. However, I concur that the AfD has connections within the German Bundestag and regional parliaments, as well as the European Parliament, that raise concerns, especially ties to Russian and Belarusian officials. While I cannot substantiate it, I suspect the party may have received financial support through various channels in the past. This might extend to media endorsements; for instance, Russian outlets like Russia Today frequently feature AfD members, who are otherwise marginalized in German mainstream media. This could be indicative of naivety or potentially alarming collusion with Russian intelligence services. Yet, a ban at this moment could be detrimental, further polarizing our society. It is not a wise course of action under the current circumstances.

Q: In light of current events, do you see the value in establishing or better funding a federal program to combat pro-Russian propaganda?

A: Absolutely, countering the deluge of misinformation emanating from sources like troll factories is critical. It's not only about the abhorrent comments regarding the so-called denazification of Ukraine but also about supporting civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their efforts to counter these deceitful narratives. Equally crucial is the fortification of our intelligence community. While I wouldn’t cast doubt on their capabilities, it's clear they are not currently equipped to meet the challenges we face. The German government should prioritize strengthening our foreign, interior, and military intelligence agencies to meet these pressing challenges. The capacity to deal with modern disinformation and manipulation is essential for our security infrastructure.

Q: The 2020 conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has significantly shifted the regional power dynamics, emphasizing Turkey's rise to prominence while casting doubt on Russia's reliability as an ally to Armenia. Is Turkey likely to act as a stabilizing force, or might its increasing influence contribute to greater instability?

A: I wouldn't classify myself as anti-Turkish, but I'm inclined to believe that the current Turkish administration is not a stabilizing influence in the ongoing conflict. What we're observing could be characterized as a resurgence of neo-Ottoman imperialism. Turkey's actions, especially under the current president, have generated considerable tension across the Eastern Mediterranean, including military involvement in Somalia and Syria, as well as in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Turkey provided substantial military aid to Azerbaijan. Fundamentally, the Turkish president's approach seems at odds with the role of a stabilizer in the region, and this extends beyond the immediate vicinity. This complicates matters further given Turkey's status as a NATO member and the United States' strategic interests there. Regrettably, it seems probable that Turkey's trajectory may lead to additional conflicts.

Q: Turkey's relationship with the United States has been strained, to the point where it threatened to close the Incirlik air base, which houses U.S. nuclear weapons. At the same time, Turkey appears to be fostering closer ties with Russia. In this context, should Turkey retain its NATO membership when its reliability as a military ally is in question?

A: For the European Union and its Western allies, devising a long-term strategic plan is essential. President Erdogan's governance, coupled with the weakening Turkish economy, suggests a precarious situation. The devaluation of the lira and soaring inflation reflect a broader discontent among the Turkish populace with the current administration. Considering Turkey's pivotal geopolitical position, it's essential to remain engaged with the Turkish political sphere and establish connections with sensible potential successors to President Erdogan. Given his advanced age and Turkey's strategic importance, outright alienation could backfire, potentially driving Turkey into a closer alliance with Russia, with more aggressive regional policies ensuing. Thus, while we face challenges with President Erdogan, pushing Turkey away could have far-reaching and detrimental consequences.

ICSE, 2024.