EGYPT AS A NEW CENTER OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the past couple of years Egypt has become a significant political player in the Middle East and North Africa region. The increasing role of Cairo as a regional power is due to a number of factors. Egypt was able to enforce domestic political stability, strengthen its economy and suppress the terrorist threat in the Sinai Peninsula. The Muslim Brotherhood has been crushed and can no longer challenge the government. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi has cemented his grip on power as the sole ruler of Egypt by neutralizing potential opponents in the armed forces (like General Ahmed Shafik).

In the past couple of years Egypt has enjoyed a relative economic boom. In 2020, Egypt’s annual GDP growth attained a record 5.6%. This year, Egypt’s GDP growth is only around 2%, mostly because of the coronavirus pandemic.¹ Egyptian development and construction companies have been expanding internationally, taking shares in the lucrative regional construction market. Egyptian companies are building a large dam in Tanzania; they are involved in major construction projects in Iraq and planning the reconstruction of Libya. In 2020, Egypt’s exports of construction materials reached $3.9 billion.

The Turkey-Qatar coalition, the main sponsor of political Islam in the region, failed to impose its political project in Syria and Libya while Saudi Arabia was defeated in Yemen. As a result, the so-called axis of resistance - Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Hezbollah movement has become an important factor in regional politics. In these circumstances, Egypt has had a chance to position itself as a moderate third force.

Although Abdel Fattah al-Sissi came to power in a military coup in 2013 with the backing of the Saudis and the UAE, he then embarked on an increasingly independent foreign policy course. Cairo is concerned about the rapprochement of the Arabian monarchies (especially the UAE and Bahrain, to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia) with Israel, which began after the 2020 Abraham Accords.² Egypt is equally unhappy with the lack of backing from of the Gulf monarchies during the Egypt/Ethiopia crisis related to the Renaissance Dam project.

The decisive position taken by Cairo in the summer of 2020 during the escalation of the Libyan crisis, put an end to the Turkish expansion in Libya. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared Sirte as a «red line» beyond which the Turks should not go, and stopped their offensive. Despite significant financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as considerable political pressure from Riyadh, Cairo has remained neutral in the Yemeni conflict. The success of the Syrian President Assad in the fight against jihadists, preserving Syria as a secular state, objectively contributed to strengthening the Egyptian position.

The main directions of Egyptian foreign policy may be defined as having three tracks:

- the Palestinian track, where the main element is the Egyptian effort to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict;

- the African track;

- the Lybian track.

The Palestinian Track

The most remarkable is the Egyptian foreign policy success in the Gaza crisis of May 2021. Egyptian mediation in the conflict strengthened the country's regional position, restored its regional influence and improved relations between President al-Sissi and the US. Since the start of the latest war in Gaza (May 7, 2021), the Egyptian leadership has taken a very different stance from its position in the 2014 conflict. In 2014, Egypt sympathized with Israel, maintaining neutral, if not hostile, relations with Palestinian factions, especially Hamas.

During the last conflict, the Egyptian position shifted: Egypt’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack by Israeli security forces on the al-Aqsa Mosque on May 7, 2021. The statement demanded Israel to stop attacking the holy site and undermining the Muslim and Christian identity of Jerusalem. On May 9, Israeli Ambassador Amira Oron was summoned to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, where she was handed a diplomatic note, protesting Israeli handling of the Al-Aqsa Mosque crisis. On May 11, during an emergency session of the League of Arab States (LAS), Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry condemned violations of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem because « Israeli attacks are encroaching on their homeland ».

Even more interesting was the reaction of the Egyptian media and high Islamic clergy to the military conflict in Gaza. Given the strong censorship and control of both the press and the clergy by the Egyptian government, one can speak of a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign. Ahmad Ammar al-Hashem, a member of the Supreme Council of Ulema, in his sermon, broadcasted on Egyptian television, called for the creation of an international Islamic military force to “counter Israeli aggression”.³ He also quoted former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as saying that “what is taken away by force can only be taken back by force”.

Another influential Islamic scholar, Ahmad Karima, in an interview with the Al-Ahram newspaper, criticized the Arabian monarchies’ conciliatory position on Israel, stating that “while the Zionist boot is treading on Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, many rich Arab states pretend not to notice, burying their heads in the sand like ostriches”.⁴

This change in rhetoric is significant. Since the 2013 military coup, the Egyptian leadership has consistently adopted a hostile stance toward Hamas. The Palestinian movement was accused of supporting terrorists in Sinai, and the former president Mohammed Mursi (the Muslim Brotherhood) was accused of “spying for Hamas”. There are at least two reasons for this turnabout. First, the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in January 2021 led to a gradual improvement of relations between Cairo and Doha. Given that Qatar is the main sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly Hamas, the reproachment between Egypt and Qatar opens up a possibility for dialogue between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, Egyptian diplomacy is concerned about the normalization of relations between a number of Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan) and Israel.

Cairo is concerned about losing its clout as a mediator between Israel and the Arab world. Cairo managed to convince Hamas to accept a cease fire. At the same time, Egypt announced the allocation of $500 million in funds for rebuilding efforts in the Gaza strip following Israeli air strikes.

One of the achievements of Egyptian diplomacy during the crisis was improving relations with the US. Initially, Biden’s perception of President al-Sissi was negative, given Egypt’s human rights record. During his campaign, Biden declared “No more blank checks for Trump’s ‘favorite dictator.’” Less than a year later, in May 2021, Biden called the Egyptian president twice to thank him for his peace efforts. Egypt was the first country visited by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on May 27, 2021, followed by the CIA Director William Burns. Thus, Egypt managed to position itself as an indispensable and loyal ally of the United States in resolving regional crises.

The African Track

The Grand Renaissance Hydroelectric Project (GRHEP), formerly known as the Millennium Project of Ethiopia, using the water resources of the Nile, is viewed by Addis Abeba as a major economic project that will produce electricity for domestic consumption, and export it to neighboring countries — Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan. China has expressed interest in investing $2 billion in the electric power sector, including global projects to electrify existing railways and build new ones. The construction of a giant hydroelectric power plant would give a strong impetus to the industrial development of Ethiopia, where 66% of the population still has no access to electricity. The $4 billion hydropower plant will start generating electricity in 2021 and will reach full capacity in 2022.

At the same time, the project raises serious concerns in Egypt. Egyptians fear that increased water intake at the source of the Nile would lead to a decrease in the river's water level, which in turn would lead to the decline of the country's agricultural sector and affect millions of Egyptian farmers. The Nile provides 90% of Egypt’s water needs. Currently, there is no formal water sharing agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia. According to the Nile River Water Agreement concluded between Egypt and Sudan in 1959, shortly after the construction of the Aswan Dam, Egypt receives 55.5 billion cubic meters of water from the Nile every year and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters. Egypt also reinforces its historic claim to regulate the Nile's water intake based on the 1929 agreement with Great Britain. At that time, London represented the interests of its colonies upstream of the Nile - Sudan, Uganda and Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania). Under this treaty, Cairo had the right to veto any projects in neighboring countries that can affect its share of water allocation.

The Ethiopian government insisted on filling the reservoir by the end of 2021 while Egypt argued that this could spell a disaster for millions of Egyptians farmer and challenge its economic security. In addition, Egypt’s confrontational position is prompted by the failure of international mediation between Egypt, Sudan (which backs Egypt) and Ethiopia. In early 2020, Egypt sought mediation by then-U.S. President Donald Trump on the Nile Dam dispute, but the Ethiopian side effectively blocked the talks. Mediation by the African Union and the president of South Africa also failed. The mission to reconcile the two sides has now been taken up again by the African Union. Speaking at the Suez Canal Control Center in Ismailia on March 27, 2021, President al-Sissi warned that the waters of the Nile are not a subject to compromise since the stability of the entire region, depends on it.

Since the summer of 2021, there has been increased coordination of Egyptian and Sudanese foreign policy efforts to counter the “Ethiopian threat”. On April 5, 2021, the London-based newspaper Rai al-Yaum, citing a high-ranking Egyptian official, reported on a number of measures jointly planned by the defense ministries of the two countries. These measures include the deployment of Egyptian air defense systems to Sudan, dispatching Egyptian topographers and military cartographers to map the areas bordering Ethiopia, sending Egyptian military advisers to Sudanese areas bordering Ethiopia. In addition, Egyptian diplomacy has intensified its offensive in the countries surrounding Ethiopia. In early June 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Kenya. In July, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry visited Uganda and Djibouti.

Some Arab experts connect the armed uprising in the Ethiopian province of Tigray in November 2020 with the activities of the Egyptian secret service. Members of the Christian Tigray ethnic group played a decisive role in the overthrow of the communist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (died in 2012), they held important positions in the Ethiopian military and civilian hierarchy, but with the arrival of the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, appointed in 2018, their influence has declined.

The Libyan Track

Libya’s direction is extremely important for Egypt's security. The existence of a friendly government in this country provides strategic depth to Egypt. The likely victory of the Islamists in Libya's civil war was a “red line” for Cairo. Egypt also has economic interests in Libya. Resource-poor Egypt hopes to receive a portion of Libya's oil revenues, as well as to participate in post-war reconstruction projects in Libya. This is why since 2014, the Egyptian government, along with the UAE, France and Russia, have backed the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its commander Khalifa Haftar. In 2019-2020, Haftar troops launched a 14-month offensive against the Government of National Accord (GNA) of F. Sarraj in Tripoli. The offensive ended in failure due to strong Turkish support for the GNA. The prospect of the LNA’s defeat at the time greatly alarmed the Egyptian leadership.

On June 20, 2020, speaking at the Sidi Barrani military base, Egyptian President Fattah al-Sissi declared that Sirt and El Jufra are “red lines” for his country and, in case of an attack by the GNA forces, Egypt is ready and willing to send its armed forces to Libya. On July 20, 2020, Egyptian parliament approved the use of the country’s armed forces outside the country. Egyptian instructors helped to set up Libyan tribal paramilitary groups along the border with Egypt.⁵ At the same time, there were attempts by the Egyptian leadership to attract to its side the hitherto neutral Gaddafa and Megariha tribes and held talks with Ahmed Gaddafedam, a cousin of the late Muammar Gaddafi and one of the heads of the Libyan security service until 2011.

However, after the Libyan ceasefire agreement in October 2020 and in view of the December 2021 presidential elections, Egyptian diplomacy is showing enviable pragmatism. On February 18, 2021, PNU Prime Minister A.H. al-Dbeibeh visited Cairo, where the interim prime minister was received by President al-Sissi. The Libyan prime minister, although from the Misrata clan opposed to Haftar, praised Egypt's role in the Libyan settlement and expressed his intention to « establish a comprehensive partnership with Egypt to learn from its experience in security and reforms. » It seems that Cairo will try to bring its candidate from Cyrenaica to power in Libya. It does not necessarily have to be Khalifa Haftar. Especially, since his image has been badly tarnished after the attack on Tripoli, during which LNA fighters took part in prisoners abuse and the shooting of civilians. It is possible that Cairo will try to replace Haftar with a figure like Aguila Saleh Issa, the Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, which is more acceptable to western Libya.

Another serious problem for Egypt in Libya is the presence of the Turkish military contingent and Turkish military bases there. Turkey has almost officially refused to withdraw its troops from Libya. At the same time, the Egyptian government has given up the idea of a military intervention in Libya. Under these circumstances, Cairo benefits, at least at this stage, from the continued presence of Russian PMC Wagner in Libya.

Arab Integration Projects

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi is sympathetic to the ideology of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism. At the beginning of his presidency, he was strongly influenced by Mohammed Hassanein Heikal (1923-2016), a prominent Arab journalist and a close associate of Gamal Abdel Nasser. At Heikal's behest, Sissi became a supporter of the pan-Arab project with two amendments. First, it should not be directed against Israel. Second, Egyptian foreign policy should be multidirectional, as opposed to the unilateral (pro-Soviet) orientation under Nasser and the pro-American one under Sadat and Mubarak.

On June 27, 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kazimi, King Abdullah II of Jordan and Egyptian President al-Sissi held a meeting in Baghdad. The leaders decided to form a trilateral bloc and to improve political, security and economic cooperation. Heads of state discussed the possibility of building Iraqi oil and gas pipelines to the Red Sea coast, the construction of new communications lines from Egypt through Jordan to Iraq, to supply Egyptian goods to Iraq and further to Iran and Central Asian states, the export of Jordanian electricity to Iraq. Iraq has historically had important economic relationships with both Egypt and Jordan.⁶

Another Egyptian pan-Arab initiative is to help Syria regain its membership in the Arab League, announced at a meeting between Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and his Syrian counterpart, Faisal al-Mikdad, in September 2021.

Conclusions

Egypt demonstrates a successful multi-vector foreign policy approach. Cairo cooperates with the United States and Russia on various international issues. The Egyptian government maintains high level contacts with Israel, but at the same time contributes to Syria's return to the international scene.

Second, the predictions of those who thought in 2014-2015 that Egypt would follow the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not come true. The Egyptian leadership maintains a strategic partnership with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but at the same time, its foreign policy is largely independent. The Egyptian government did not send its troops to Yemen and maintains friendly relations with Bashar al-Assad's government in Damascus.

Third, in the short term, the main direction of Egyptian policy is likely to be African, given the contradictions with Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam. In this regard, one can predict increased Egyptian activity on the African continent and in the African Union.

Fourth, Cairo has clear regional ambitions in the Middle East, seeking to play the same role that Egypt played under Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership. Under these circumstances, Egypt's main adversary remains Turkey. Several rounds of consultations held in 2021 by the two sides to normalize relations have not yielded results. Cairo and Ankara are suspicious of each other. First of all, there is Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Egyptian leadership perceives as a threat to its political stability. Second, the presence of the Turkish armed forces in Libya. Third, the contradictions in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Cairo has firmly taken the side of Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In the long term, the conflict between the two states could be fought over leadership not only in the Middle East but also in the Sunni segment of the Islamic world, especially since Saudi Arabia, facing increasing foreign policy challenges, is hardly capable of such leadership.

NOTES

1. According to Yaman al-Hamaki, an economics professor at Ain Shams University in Cairo.

2. The Abraham Accords are agreements between State of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and the United States of America.

3. According to his proposal the force should consist of representatives of all madhhabs, including the Shiite one.

4. Karima also made a veiled criticism of the de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, stating that "one must fully accept the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah, and not divide hadiths into strong and weak ones." Here it is worth recalling Mohammed bin Salman's April 28, 2021 interview with Al-Arabiya in which the crown prince, speaking of moderate Islam, noted that not all hadiths are suitable for the modern world.

5. Namely Awlad Ali, Ababida and Al-Bara'as.

6. The three countries - along with North Yemen - came together in a very short-lived partnership called the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) from 1989 to 1990. In the summer of 1990, however, the Iraqi army occupied Kuwait, and Egypt joined the U.S.-led military coalition against Baghdad