International Center for the Study of Eurasia
EUROPE: BETWEEN TURBULENCE AND RECKONING
Analytical Brief n.33, April 2025
In March and April 2025, the International Centre for Security and Europe (ICSE) interviewed several European civil servants who requested anonymity. Drawing on these experts' insights and our own expertise, this essay synthesizes perspectives on Europe’s new political and economic reality.
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In the three months since Donald Trump returned to the White House, European policymakers have found themselves navigating a new era of uncertainty, now the defining factor in international relations. Brussels and other European capitals have been forced to confront two closely linked and pressing issues:
• the future direction of U.S. defense policy regarding NATO, and the broader architecture of European security
• a fundamental shift in U.S. trade policy toward the European Union.
These two domains—security and trade—have long served as the twin pillars of the transatlantic relationship. Under Trump's renewed leadership, both are being redefined, compelling European governments to reassess their foundational assumptions about the United States as a stable and reliable partner.
U.S. defense policy has disrupted the strategic equilibrium in Europe, replacing it with a growing sense of unpredictability. Trump's ambivalence toward NATO—expressed in campaign rhetoric and echoed in off-the-cuff remarks since assuming office—has reignited fears that the U.S. security guarantee, enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is no longer ironclad. While official statements from the Pentagon continue to affirm U.S. commitments, Trump's suggestions that NATO members must “pay up or lose protection” have shaken trust in Washington's role as the cornerstone of European defense. Eastern European countries, especially the Baltic states and Poland, which rely heavily on U.S. deterrence against Russia, have found themselves caught in a new calculus of self-reliance.
France and Germany, in particular, have responded by accelerating conversations around “strategic autonomy” — the notion that Europe must be capable of defending itself independently of American power. The European Defense Fund, NATO's European Pillar initiatives, and Franco-German proposals for a joint command structure have gained renewed urgency. Yet these developments face internal friction within the EU itself.
Meanwhile, U.S. trade policy has taken a decisively ambiguous turn: the Trump administration first imposed a sweeping 20% tariff on European imports as promised, then suspended it for 90 days. This partial reprieve has introduced a degree of tactical delay rather than de-escalation. In parallel, the European Commission has opted to postpone its retaliatory tariffs, signaling a momentary pause in what many feared would be a full-blown transatlantic trade war. However, the truce remains “fragile,” as the French president Emmanuel Macron remarked, since the 25% tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles and the 10% tariffs on all other products remained in place; these tariffs amounted to €52 billion for the European Union.
This cautious maneuvering on both sides suggests less a reconciliation than a mutual hesitation—a kind of strategic breathing room amid escalating global trade tensions. Trump's second presidency is not merely a rerun of the first; it marks a new phase of unpredictability. The postwar transatlantic alliance—once rooted in mutual trust and shared purpose—now hangs in suspension, its foundations increasingly unstable.
The coming months will test Europe's resolve. The EU must now navigate a geopolitical landscape where old alliances offer fewer certainties. Europe now faces its historic turning point: to evolve from strategic dependency toward strategic autonomy—or risk relegation to a secondary role in a world of great-power competition.
The return of long-forgotten concepts like neo-mercantilism and balance-of-power point to a necessity for Europe to acquire operational autonomy in domains related to security and economic development. EU foreign policy and diplomacy may become fully autonomous and credible only if they are backed by a sustainable economy, defense capabilities, and political unity.
Europe Responds to U.S. Shift in Defense Policy
In light of the United States' recent insistence that the European Union independently manage its security concerns, particularly regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, European leaders have initiated several strategic measures to bolster their defense autonomy and support for Ukraine.
Recognizing the need for greater self-reliance in defense, the EU has proposed significant measures to strengthen its military capabilities. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the “Readiness 2030” initiative, aiming to mobilize up to €800 billion to enhance Europe's defense infrastructure. This plan addresses geopolitical threats, notably the ongoing war in Ukraine, and uncertainties regarding U.S. military support.
To coordinate a unified response, European nations have established the “Weimar+” group, expanding the original Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, and Poland) to include the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and the European Commission. This alliance focuses on promoting European sovereignty and geopolitical influence, particularly concerning continued aid for Ukraine and potential increases in national military spending.
Timeline for an Independent EU Defense Posture
The timeline for the European Union to develop defense forces capable of deterring or repelling a full-scale Russian offensive without relying on U.S. support is complex and shaped by structural, political, and logistical variables. At the heart of this assessment lie three interrelated factors: the current military capabilities gap, the trajectory of ongoing defense initiatives, and the enduring obstacles that may delay efforts toward strategic autonomy.
The EU currently lacks the independent military capabilities required to confront a large-scale Russian attack, particularly in Eastern Europe. This deficiency stems from several systemic limitations: the absence of a unified command structure, severe shortages in munitions, air and missile defense systems, and logistical support. The limited readiness of European troops, both in training and ability to deploy rapidly across borders, further compounds these challenges.
Despite these hurdles, the EU has launched ambitious initiatives to enhance its defense posture. In the short term (2025/27), the “Readiness 2030” initiative represents a foundational investment in defense production, logistics integration, and procurement reform. While this period may see improved stockpiles, accelerated troop deployment, and bolstered cyber-defense capacities, the bloc is unlikely to achieve full deterrence capabilities. At best, it will reinforce NATO's eastern flank while continuing to rely on the United States for strategic depth.
In the medium term (2028/30), a more credible regional defense capacity may emerge. The EU could potentially field one to two rapid reaction corps totaling between 30,000 and 60,000 troops. Integrated air and missile defense systems may also materialize alongside expanded industrial output for critical defense technologies. However, strategic deterrence will remain incomplete due to the nuclear capabilities gap. France, the only EU member state with nuclear weapons, resists calls for shared command, limiting the EU's ability to project a unified nuclear posture. Consequently, while the EU may deter limited Russian aggression in regions like the Baltics or Balkans, it will remain dependent on NATO and U.S. support for broader escalation scenarios.
In the long term (2030/35), the EU could, under favorable conditions, attain strategic autonomy. This scenario assumes the sustained alignment of political will, adequate funding, and unity among member states. If these conditions are met, Europe could construct a unified military command structure, increase defense spending to 2-3% of GDP, develop autonomous satellite and surveillance capabilities, and establish a credible full-spectrum deterrence posture. Full operational independence from the U.S. could potentially be achieved by 2032/35.
Nevertheless, formidable obstacles threaten this trajectory. Political fragmentation remains a core risk, as member states possess diverging threat perceptions and strategic cultures, exemplified by the contrasting priorities of France, Poland, and Germany. Fiscal conservatism, particularly in Southern Europe, complicates efforts to increase defense budgets. Meanwhile, Europe's defense industrial base is plagued by bottlenecks, with prolonged delays in the production of essential equipment.
The EU's path toward military self-reliance unfolds across a staged progression. By 2025/27, basic deterrence capabilities may emerge. Between 2028-2030, regional autonomy to deter localized aggression becomes possible. Full strategic independence remains a longer-term ambition, potentially achievable only by the mid-2030s—provided unity, investment, and political resolve endure.
Continued European Support for Ukraine
As U.S. support for Ukraine becomes increasingly uncertain due to shifting domestic political dynamics, the European Union is emerging as the principal guarantor of Kyiv's defense and sovereignty. This evolving role marks not just a tactical response to war, but a deeper recalibration of Europe's geopolitical identity. European leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine through increased defense spending, structural fiscal reforms, and a renewed declaration of strategic autonomy. The message is clear: Europe intends not only to stand with Ukraine but also to shoulder a larger share of continental security.
The war in Ukraine has catalyzed unprecedented changes in European defense policy. Since 2022, member states have dramatically increased defense budgets, reinvested in dormant industrial capacities, and coordinated arms deliveries through the European Peace Facility. Recent indications of U.S. disengagement have pushed the EU toward a more self-reliant defense posture. In response, European leaders have agreed to expand fiscal flexibility on defense spending and authorize collective borrowing of up to €150 billion aimed at upgrading military capabilities across the Union. This decision signals the emergence of a shared European defense effort financed through instruments once reserved for economic crises and pandemic recovery.
By embracing collective borrowing, the EU is effectively treating defense as a shared existential responsibility, not merely a national prerogative. This moves the Union closer to functioning as a geopolitical actor capable of sustaining military operations without over-reliance on NATO's American pillar. This approach strengthens internal cohesion, as collective borrowing ensures that smaller and economically weaker states can contribute to and benefit from a pan-European defense architecture.
Political declarations accompanying these fiscal commitments underscore the strategic narrative driving Europe's support for Ukraine. European leaders have insisted that no diplomatic settlement can be imposed on Kyiv without its active participation, thereby rejecting any revival of great-power spheres of influence. This position reaffirms the EU's normative identity as a defender of sovereignty, the rule of law, and democratic agency—not only within its borders but in its broader neighborhood. At a time when authoritarian revisionism threatens to redraw the European map, this principled stance reinforces the legitimacy of the European project itself.
Equally important is the EU's insistence that Europe is capable of countering Russian threats independently. While this remains aspirational in operational terms, the rhetoric has shifted from dependency to capacity-building. Defense cooperation initiatives, such as expanding the European Defence Agency's mandate and accelerating joint procurement mechanisms, illustrate that the groundwork for autonomy is being laid. The EU's growing investments in cyber-defense, surveillance satellites, and air-missile defense systems demonstrate its intention to construct a multidimensional deterrence framework.
The war in Ukraine has provided the EU with what has long eluded it: a unifying strategic horizon. Continued support for Ukraine is no longer just a matter of solidarity; it is a litmus test for Europe's capacity to defend its values and interests in a rapidly changing world.
The Role of the UK
In the shifting architecture of European security and transatlantic uncertainty, the United Kingdom occupies an increasingly ambivalent position. Having exited the European Union, Britain continues to assert its strategic alignment with the United States while maintaining a dense web of bilateral defense relationships with key European powers. This dual posture—asserting independence while relying on proximity—has exposed underlying contradictions in Britain’s global identity.
London’s pursuit of a post-Brexit foreign policy, loosely defined under the banner of “Global Britain,” has aimed to project an image of sovereign reach and agile diplomacy. Yet in practice, its strategic posture has often been shaped more by inherited obligations and shifting alliances than by an articulated long-term vision. The Anglo-French security relationship—structured by the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties—remains a notable exception: a mature and operational bilateral framework, encompassing joint expeditionary forces and advanced weapons development. Similar partnerships with Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states have also gained new urgency amid the war in Ukraine.
British support for Ukraine has been strong—comprising arms deliveries, training missions, and diplomatic coordination—but its strategic significance remains bound to broader geopolitical shifts. If the United States and the European Union continue to diverge on key defense and security questions, the UK may find itself trapped between loyalties. While its instincts tend toward Washington, the demands of European stability and NATO credibility impose countervailing pressures. Britain risks becoming a strategic outlier: too disengaged from European defense integration to shape it, yet too dependent on the U.S. to chart an autonomous course.
Still, this ambiguous position could be leveraged—if Britain chooses to act as a connector between the evolving European defense structures and NATO’s Atlantic core. Doing so would require more than historical prestige or residual influence; it would demand structural engagement with European defense planning, procurement, and long-term strategic vision. In an emerging order defined by power consolidation and geopolitical fragmentation, the UK must decide whether it will adapt to new continental realities or remain tethered to an Atlantic architecture no longer capable of guaranteeing stability on its own.
Technological Innovation
Following the logic of boosting its defenses and economic capabilities as a guarantee of its security, the EU recently announced its plan to invest in Artificial Intelligence. The EU has unveiled a comprehensive €20 billion plan to construct AI “gigafactories” across the continent. This initiative seeks to bridge the technological gap between Europe and global leaders such as the United States and China, thereby enhancing the EU's technological sovereignty.
The proposed gigafactories are envisioned as expansive facilities equipped with state-of-the-art supercomputers and data centers dedicated to developing next-generation AI models. Unlike the EU's existing 13 AI factories, these new establishments will be significantly larger and are intended to drive cutting-edge technological projects in healthcare, biotechnology, and robotics. Europe needs to catch up with global competitors: in 2024, U.S. institutions produced 40 notable AI models and China developed 15, while Europe contributed only three, all originating from France. This disparity illustrates the pressing need for Europe to bolster its AI capabilities to secure technological sovereignty.
Beyond AI infrastructure, the EU is also prioritizing domestically produced AI semiconductors, recognizing their critical role in reducing reliance on foreign technology. These initiatives reflect the EU's recognition of AI's transformative potential and its determination to secure a prominent role in the global AI landscape. By investing in innovative infrastructure and fostering a conducive regulatory environment, Europe aims not only to catch up with current leaders but to chart its own course in artificial intelligence.
European Defense Technologies
The creation of sovereign AI infrastructure, along with investments in defense innovation, signals a new era of European self-reliance. This push for autonomy extends beyond AI into defense technologies, including hypersonic systems, next-generation cyber-defense frameworks, and secure satellite communication networks. These efforts focus on ensuring Europe can defend its interests without overreliance on external powers.
• Hypersonics
Hypersonic systems represent a rapidly advancing frontier in modern military technology. These weapons or vehicles travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5—more than five times the speed of sound. Two primary categories define this field: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) launched via rockets that then glide through the atmosphere, and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) propelled by air-breathing engines that maintain hypersonic velocity throughout flight. Their unprecedented combination of speed, maneuverability, and unpredictable trajectories severely challenge current missile defense systems, potentially rendering them obsolete. The geopolitical ramifications are substantial. The United States, China, and Russia are deeply invested in deploying hypersonic systems, initiating a new arms race defined by speed and precision rather than numbers. Europe, historically slower to develop these capabilities, is now responding with increasing urgency. Through NATO collaborations and national programs—such as France's ASN4G initiative—the European Union is signaling a strategic pivot. Recent EU defense investment strategies prioritize developing indigenous hypersonic technologies and counter-hypersonic defense systems, reinforcing Europe's broader goal of technological and strategic autonomy.
• Cybersecurity
Parallel to advancements in physical weaponry is the evolution of digital warfare through next-generation cyber-defense frameworks. These go beyond traditional measures like firewalls and antivirus software. Modern cyber-defense systems are increasingly integrated and intelligent, leveraging artificial intelligence for threat detection, employing quantum-resistant encryption, and coordinating real-time responses across sectors. They promote deep intelligence sharing between government and private actors. Cyberwarfare now occupies a central role in hybrid conflict, where attacks on infrastructure, electoral systems, financial institutions, and military command structures can paralyze entire states without conventional weapons.
In recognition of these threats, the EU has been working to fortify its digital frontiers. A cornerstone effort is the development of the Joint Cyber Unit (JCU), intended to unify and coordinate the cyber-defense capabilities of individual member states. The EU is also directing funding toward research in post-quantum cryptography and drafting robust legislative frameworks, such as the forthcoming Cyber Resilience Act. This legislation aims to enforce “security-by-design” in all connected products and services, ensuring that Europe's digital ecosystem is both innovative and secure.
• Secure Satellite Networks
As geopolitical tensions extend beyond Earth's surface, satellite-based communication security has become a strategic imperative. Secure satellite communication networks serve as the backbone for vital operations ranging from military and intelligence communications to disaster response and encrypted government messaging. These systems utilize advanced technologies such as quantum encryption, AI-based routing, and resilient mesh networking to protect against jamming, surveillance, and cyber intrusion.
In this domain, the EU is asserting its sovereignty through projects like IRIS²—the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite. This sovereign satellite constellation is envisioned as a European counterpart to systems like SpaceX's Starlink or China's BeiDou. IRIS² will offer encrypted and resilient communications for military and government applications, with a focus on cybersecurity, interoperability, and strategic independence from non-European infrastructure.
Together, these initiatives signal a fundamental shift in Europe's defense posture, underscoring the EU's determination to safeguard its sovereignty in an increasingly complex global security environment.
Towards a New Protective Democracy Model
The resurgence of far-right nationalism across Europe has raised the specter of fragmentation within the European Union—not just politically but in its fundamental identity as a liberal, multilateral project.
On the international scene, Trump's return to the American presidency serves as a cautionary tale for Europe. Trumpism represents not just a political style but a systemic corrosion of institutional norms, legal order, and transnational cooperation. Under Trump, governance has become increasingly transactional, performative, and hostile to international frameworks that undergird collective security. For the EU, the lesson is clear: a liberal political architecture that lacks the strength to defend itself will ultimately collapse into irrelevance or submission. Democratic values must be fortified by coherent institutions and decisive leadership capable of resisting the populist tide.
Europe's institutional architecture is ill-equipped to meet this challenge. The European Union faces governance by diffusion. While its structures prioritize consensus and subsidiarity, these features have become liabilities in the face of systemic crises. The war in Ukraine has exposed the EU's reliance on American military protection, even as internal actors like Hungary's Viktor Orbán and the rise of parties like Germany's AfD or France's Rassemblement National challenge the bloc's political and ideological cohesion. Decision-making is often paralyzed by unanimity requirements, while urgent threats—military, technological, environmental—demand speed, clarity, and resolve.
Trump's tariffs threaten European political stability. If implemented after the 90-day suspension, the consequences could negatively affect European labor markets. Social welfare systems across the EU would face strain, particularly in countries with generous unemployment benefits like France, Germany, and the Nordic states. Youth employment in Southern Europe, where post-COVID recovery remains fragile, would be especially vulnerable.
The political consequences could be severe. Increased unemployment and economic insecurity would likely provoke labor unrest, with strikes and protests erupting in the most affected industries. The crisis could provide fertile ground for populist and nationalist parties, particularly if the EU is perceived as failing to protect workers from global economic confrontation.
In such an environment, the EU may find itself compelled to rediscover the benefits of centralized authority, reminiscent of Charles De Gaulle’s authoritarianism.(1) This would not take the form of classic authoritarianism but rather a form of strategic centralization—a protective framework designed to safeguard liberal-democratic values by limiting the terrain on which their enemies can operate. Such a shift would mean empowering EU institutions' executive levels, streamlining decision-making in critical areas like defense and foreign policy, and reaffirming ideological boundaries around democratic norms, rule of law, and strategic autonomy. The objective would not be to diminish democracy but to insulate it from ideological extremism and institutional inertia.
This development may already be underway. The recent condemnation of Marine Le Pen—both through legal investigations and political exclusion—can be read as a signal that the political center is no longer willing to accommodate actors whose platforms fundamentally threaten the European project. This echoes de Gaulle’s own intolerance for what he perceived as forces of disorder: pluralism was acceptable only insofar as it did not undermine the integrity of the state. In the contemporary EU, such a stance may translate into a more aggressive defense of the Union’s ideological boundaries, even if it means reducing the range of acceptable political expression.
There are, of course, significant risks. Any movement toward greater centralization must navigate the fine line between legitimate authority and creeping authoritarianism. The memory of Europe’s twentieth-century traumas remains vivid. To preserve a space for pluralism, rights, and transnational cooperation, the EU may need to adopt a stronger hand, one guided not by populist appeals, but by a technocratic ethos of responsibility, clarity, and long-term vision.
In this light, we may be witnessing the early signs of a post-Gaullist Europe—not nostalgic, but adaptive. A Europe that remembers the utility of strength in the face of dissolution. A Europe that, far from abandoning democracy, reasserts its foundations through sovereign institutions capable of facing the world as it is. Whether such a project can emerge without undermining the values it seeks to protect remains an open question—but it is a question that can no longer be postponed.
Conclusion
Today, the transatlantic relationship is at a critical juncture. Europe faces both an unpredictable United States and persistent instability along its eastern flank—conditions that demand the transformation of challenges into opportunities. European initiatives in defense autonomy, technological sovereignty, and economic resilience are more than crisis responses; they reflect the continent’s potential emergence as a unified geopolitical actor, capable of defending its interests without indefinitely outsourcing its security.
This evolution, however, requires a reimagining of European governance. The Union’s current consensus-based model is ill-suited to the scale and speed of contemporary threats. A more centralized and decisive mode of action—what might be called a “protective democracy”—may be necessary to preserve both effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. Whether Europe can successfully navigate this transformation will determine its future in the global order—and whether it shapes that order, or is shaped by others. The stakes are high: sustained dependency risks external manipulation and internal disintegration, while strategic autonomy could mark the beginning of a new era of European agency and resilience.
(1) Charles De Gaulle’s model of leadership was defined by strong executive authority, national sovereignty, and long-range strategic vision. Though firmly rooted in democratic institutions, it bore the imprint of what could be called authoritarian modernization: an emphasis on competence, state dignity, and a high tolerance for executive discretion. Pompidou, his successor, extended this tradition through economic planning and technocratic governance, blending strong state leadership with a vision of modernity. Both men operated within the framework of a republic, but one where the executive was not hostage to every passing political whim. They embodied a style of leadership that was paternal, strategic, and above all, cohesive.