JOHN GHAZVINIAN

Dr. John Ghazvinian is the Executive Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania. He is an academic, author, and former journalist, specializing in the history of US-Iran relations. His latest book, America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present (Knopf, 2021) — a comprehensive survey of the bilateral relationship, based on years of archival research in both countries — was named by the New York Times as one of “100 Notable Books of 2021”.

Question: How much impact do you think the next president of Iran will have on Iranian foreign policy, if any? My understanding is that the position of the president of Iran is somewhat analogous to that of a vice president in the United States.

Answer: The influence of the president of Iran on foreign policy is not expected to change substantively. You are correct in noting that the ultimate decisions regarding foreign policy, especially those that are sensitive to national security, are made at the Supreme National Security Council level, which includes the president. The president plays an important role within this framework. However, major high-level national security decisions, such as those involving proxy militias in the region, the nuclear program, and negotiations with countries like the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia, are not made by the president alone. These decisions are collaborative and involve multiple stakeholders within the government. The president does wield significant influence over a wide range of foreign policy decisions. Foreign policy encompasses more than just the nuclear program and relations with major powers; it also includes decisions like opening embassies in various countries, staffing them, launching initiatives, and engaging with local media. These lower-level decisions are typically managed by the foreign ministry and presided over by the president. I do not expect to see a dramatic change in this structure. Much will depend on the individual who becomes president, but the larger trend to watch is the succession of the Supreme Leader, which will significantly impact the direction of the Islamic Republic.

Q: Do you think the close cooperation between Russia and Iran that we witnessed under President Raisi will continue? Under Rouhani, it certainly wasn't as strong.

A: Iran's relationship with Russia has always been transactional and instrumental rather than a deep friendship. Historically, Iran has harbored significant suspicion and discomfort towards its powerful northern neighbor, more so than towards the United States. This long-standing anxiety has shaped Iran's cautious approach to Russia.

In recent years, Iran and Russia have formed a sort of alliance of convenience, largely due to their shared opposition to the United States and the Western bloc. This partnership has provided tactical opportunities for cooperation, such as in the realm of drone technology.

Additionally, Russia has learned from Iran's experience in circumventing sanctions, a skill Iran has honed over the past decade and a half. This stuff was not new for Iran. Iran had become very good at learning how to evade and get around sanctions over many years. It's become very sophisticated in that. And the Russians have been learning, I think, to some degree from Iran's example of how to deal with these kinds of extreme, stringent sanctions. We're talking about things like SWIFT, central bank sanctions, and so on. It just got more attention because it was Russia. But Iran and to some extent Venezuela as well have been learning and dealing with these kinds of sanctions for a long time. This has facilitated discussions around de-dollarization and alternative financial structures, and Iran's recent inclusion in BRICS underscores its role in this evolving economic landscape.

The relationship between Iran and Russia is thus characterized by pragmatic considerations rather than ideological alignment. Both countries benefit from collaborating in areas where their interests converge, such as military technology and navigating economic sanctions. This cooperation is likely to continue as long as both nations face common geopolitical adversaries. Iran's transactional approach to its relationship with Russia can be traced back to a long history of cautious engagement. The two countries have often found themselves on opposite sides of historical events, leading to a relationship defined by mutual suspicion and pragmatic collaboration rather than a genuine alliance. This pattern is likely to continue, with both nations leveraging their partnership to counterbalance Western influence and achieve their respective geopolitical goals.

Moreover, the cooperation between Iran and Russia is not uniform across all aspects of their bilateral relationship. While military and economic collaborations have gained prominence, other areas such as cultural exchanges and political ideology do not reflect the same level of alignment. This nuanced partnership underscores the complexity of international relations, where nations often navigate multiple layers of interaction based on immediate and strategic needs.

Q: Is there potential for a return to negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? The Americans have been discussing it, releasing frozen assets, and negotiating prisoner exchanges. How tangible is this?

A: I do not foresee a formal return to the JCPOA soon. Both the Biden and Raisi administrations have been attempting to implement aspects of the JCPOA quietly through informal channels, such as Omani negotiations. However, the political climate in both countries is not conducive to a serious return to the JCPOA, especially with the upcoming US election. The original negotiations that led to the JCPOA began in 2009, and much has changed since then. Iran has now achieved a level of nuclear capability where the only barrier to weaponization is a political decision, not technical capacity. This fundamentally alters the problem the JCPOA was designed to address.

Furthermore, Iran's economy has been severely impacted by sanctions, and its nuclear capabilities have grown significantly. Any sanctions relief offered by the United States would likely be limited, and any rollback in Iran's nuclear program would be minimal. Thus, the JCPOA no longer holds the same relevance it once did.

The core issue between the United States and Iran is political, not technical. Resolving the nuclear issue requires a broader political process of trust-building and détente, which currently seems unlikely. The JCPOA was a product of a specific historical context, and replicating that process today would require significant shifts in both countries' political landscapes.

Additionally, the changing dynamics within the Middle East and the evolving global political landscape complicate a straightforward return to the JCPOA. The deal was born out of a particular set of geopolitical circumstances that no longer exist. The interplay of regional power politics, the rise of new alliances, and the shifting priorities of both the United States and Iran necessitate a more nuanced approach to diplomacy and conflict resolution.

The United States' approach towards Iran has been influenced by broader strategic considerations, including its relationships with key regional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. These alliances have always played a critical role in shaping US policy towards Iran, often limiting the scope for diplomatic engagement. Similarly, Iran's strategic calculus involves balancing its regional ambitions with the need to mitigate external pressures and maintain domestic stability.

In this context, any potential return to JCPOA negotiations would require not only a mutual willingness to engage but also a comprehensive understanding of the altered geopolitical landscape. Confidence-building measures, incremental steps toward détente, and multilateral engagements involving regional stakeholders could pave the way for more substantive negotiations. However, the path to such a diplomatic breakthrough remains fraught with challenges and uncertainties.

Q: There is talk about US-Iran negotiations in Oman aimed at diffusing tensions and avoiding war. Do you think these will be successful?

A: I am not privy to any special information regarding these talks, but I believe that such negotiations are beneficial. The primary goal appears to be reducing the potential for conflict and avoiding military escalation. While it is difficult to predict their success, these discussions should take place than not. The current geopolitical environment is fraught with tensions that could easily escalate into conflict. Diplomatic engagements, even if they are informal or exploratory, provide a necessary avenue for communication and de-escalation. These talks reflect a mutual recognition of the high stakes involved and the catastrophic consequences of a potential military confrontation. However, the success of these negotiations depends on multiple factors, including the willingness of both parties to make concessions and the influence of external actors. Regional allies and adversaries, domestic political pressures, and broader international dynamics all play a role in shaping the outcomes of these discussions.

It is also important to recognize that negotiations like these often involve a complex interplay of interests and agendas. The primary actors may have differing priorities and red lines, and finding common ground can be challenging. Nevertheless, the continuation of dialogue is a positive sign, as it keeps channels of communication open and provides opportunities for conflict resolution.

The context of these negotiations is also crucial. The broader geopolitical landscape, including relations between the United States and its allies, the strategic interests of regional powers, and the internal political dynamics within Iran, all influence the potential for successful talks. In this complex environment, achieving meaningful progress requires a nuanced and multifaceted approach to diplomacy.

Q: How would you define the roots of the Iran-Israel conflict? Is it religious, and what conditions might ease the standoff? Would the creation of a Palestinian state help?

A: The roots of the Iran-Israel conflict are not fundamentally religious, though religion does play a role. It is primarily a political disagreement stemming from regional alignments and realignments in the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, Israel did not perceive Iran as a significant threat, focusing instead on its Arab neighbors. However, as regional dynamics shifted, Iran and Israel found themselves in opposition.

In the 1980s, Israel's primary concerns were its immediate Arab neighbors, such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Iran, under the Islamic Republic, was focused on consolidating its revolutionary government and did not initially pose a direct threat to Israel. However, the end of the Cold War and the shifting alliances in the Middle East changed this dynamic. Arab states began to align more closely with the United States, and the peace process through Madrid and Oslo altered regional priorities.

Iran began to see itself as a spoiler in the peace process, supporting groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as a way to exert influence and counteract what it perceived as Western-backed aggression. This support was both tactical and ideological, driven by a combination of anti-imperialism, religious solidarity, and geopolitical strategy.

The conflict has since evolved into a zero-sum game, where any gain for one side is seen as a loss for the other. Iran's stance on Palestine is multifaceted, incorporating religious, ideological, political, and tactical elements. The various factions within the Iranian government support the Palestinian cause for different reasons, ranging from anti-imperialism to religious duty. Easing the standoff between Iran and Israel would require addressing these complex and intertwined factors.

The creation of a Palestinian state could potentially reduce some of the tensions, but it would not address all the underlying issues. A comprehensive peace process that includes all regional stakeholders and addresses broader security concerns would be necessary to achieve lasting stability.

Q: Would you characterize Iran as a theocracy? How does this align with Iranian and Persian state traditions?

A: Labeling Iran as a theocracy is complex and nuanced. While the Islamic Republic exhibits elements of theocracy, it also seeks legitimacy from sources beyond religious authority, such as popular elections. These elections are flawed but indicate a system that is not purely theocratic. The Islamic Republic has always tried, sometimes with varying degrees of success, to seek popular legitimacy. Elections, though imperfect, serve as a mechanism for gauging public sentiment and maintaining a semblance of democratic governance. The constitution mandates regular elections for the presidency, parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, which chooses the Supreme Leader. Even though these elections are not entirely free and fair, they reflect an effort to incorporate popular will into the governance structure.

Historically, Iran has not been a pure theocracy. Since the Safavid era, religious legitimacy has been important, but it has coexisted with other forms of governance. The relationship between the clergy and the state has been symbiotic, with each recognizing the other's authority in certain areas. This dynamic is similar to the historical relationships between church and state in other contexts, such as the Russian Orthodox Church and the Tsars, or the Catholic Church and European monarchies.

Iran's modern history, particularly since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, has seen an ongoing tension between secular and religious authority. The Pahlavi dynasty's efforts to modernize and secularize the country led to a marginalization of the clergy, which contributed to the backlash of the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Republic that emerged from this revolution sought to integrate religious principles with state governance, resulting in a unique and complex political system.

The Iranian state has always been a blend of various traditions and influences. The Safavid dynasty, which established Twelver Shia Islam as the state religion in the 16th century, set a precedent for the integration of religious authority into the governance structure. However, even during this period, the state maintained elements of secular administration and sought to balance religious influence with other forms of legitimacy.

In the modern era, the Pahlavi shahs attempted to reduce the influence of the clergy and promote a secular, nationalist identity. This effort was met with resistance from the religious establishment, leading to a growing divide between secular and religious factions. The 1979 revolution, which brought the Islamic Republic to power, was a response to these tensions and sought to establish a new form of governance that combined religious authority with popular sovereignty. The resulting system defies simple categorization. While the Supreme Leader holds significant power and the state is deeply influenced by Islamic principles, there are also elements of democratic governance and popular participation. This hybrid model reflects Iran's unique historical trajectory and the ongoing interplay between different sources of legitimacy.

Q: There is significant economic and social differentiation in modern Iran under the Islamic Republic, with a great divide between the rich and poor. Can you explain this disparity? A: Economic inequality in Iran has worsened recently due to official corruption, the impact of sanctions, and economic mismanagement.

Sanctions have led to a crony economy, increasing illicit activities and widening the gap between the elites and the general population. While there was significant inequality in the 1970s, the Islamic Republic initially made strides in reducing this through social welfare programs. The revolution's early years saw efforts to redistribute wealth and provide for the poor, particularly through initiatives funded by oil revenues. However, over time, these gains have been undermined by various factors. Sanctions have played a major role in exacerbating economic difficulties. The sanctions regime has restricted Iran's access to international markets, limited its ability to engage in global trade, and crippled its financial sector. These restrictions have disproportionately affected the middle and lower classes, while those with connections to the government and access to illicit channels have often found ways to circumvent the economic barriers.

The Iranian economy has also suffered from mismanagement and corruption. State-owned enterprises, which dominate key sectors of the economy, are often inefficient and plagued by nepotism and lack of accountability. This has led to a concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a few, while the broader population faces economic hardship.

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