THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF RUSSIA'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE

The use of nuclear weapons has traditionally been framed within the binary of deterrence and total war. However, in the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the declining authoritarian regime—such as that of Russia, introduces a third function: coercive nuclear signaling. We examine the conditions under which Russia might employ tactical nuclear weapons, the strategic rationale behind such use, and the potential responses from NATO and the international community at large. As the Russian armed forces demonstrated their ineptness, and Russia faces continuous economic stagnation, its leadership may view tactical nuclear use as a means to freeze a conflict rather than achieving outright victory. The timeframe is 2025/30.

The Escalate-to-De-escalate Doctrine and Russian Decline

Historically, authoritarian regimes in decline tend to become more aggressive. Their perception of existential threats—whether military, economic, or internal—often prompts such regimes to adopt high-risk strategies to maintain control and external leverage. Russia’s escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine encapsulates this logic. This military strategy envisions the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons not as a step toward full-scale nuclear confrontation but as a coercive tool to force adversaries into negotiating on Russia’s terms.

Should Russia’s long-term hybrid warfare strategy fail—either due to NATO's newfound resolve or the economic erosion of the Russian state—the Kremlin could opt for nuclear coercion as a way of securing a geopolitical stalemate. Such a move would not be unprecedented in military history; rather, it would align with patterns observed in declining powers that seek to leverage their remaining strengths against superior opponents.

Russia's official nuclear doctrine, published in 2020, states nuclear weapons would only be used in response to a nuclear attack on Russia or its allies, or a conventional attack that threatens the existence of the Russian state. However, operational doctrine appears to differ significantly from this official position. Evidence for this includes multiple instances of simulated tactical nuclear strikes during major exercises, including Zapad-2017 and Grom-2019; the 2017 Naval Doctrine specifically referencing nuclear weapons as a means to "de-escalate" conflicts; articles in Voyennaya Mysl (Russia's leading military journal) discussing nuclear use as a viable option in regional conflicts; and between 2022-2024, Russia made at least 27 explicit nuclear threats related to the Ukraine conflict, signaling potential first use.

Russian military thinking appears to encompass several nuclear concepts beyond the simplified "escalate-to-de-escalate." These include "Escalate to Win" (using nuclear weapons to achieve decisive advantage rather than simply forcing negotiation), "Strategic Operations for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets" (integrated conventional-nuclear operations targeting key adversary infrastructure), "Regional Nuclear Deterrence" (using tactical weapons to establish regional hegemony without triggering strategic responses), and "Escalation Management" (carefully calibrated nuclear demonstrations to control conflict dynamics).

The concept of "reflexive control"—influencing an adversary's decision-making process by manipulating their perception—is central to understanding Russian approach to nuclear coercion. Examples include strategic ambiguity with deliberate inconsistency in nuclear messaging, nuclear capability demonstrations showcasing new systems with exaggerated capabilities, threshold manipulation by constantly shifting declared red lines, and institutional splitting to create division within adversary decision-making structures. This approach aims to paralyze Western decision-making through uncertainty and fear rather than through direct military confrontation.

Potential Triggers for Tactical Nuclear Use

The likelihood of Russia resorting to tactical nuclear weapons depends on the specific conditions it faces by 2030. Three plausible scenarios emerge as particularly conducive to this escalation.

• First, a naval war in the Baltic could serve as a trigger if Russia's conventional navy is decisively defeated or blockaded by NATO forces. In this case, Russia might conduct a demonstrative nuclear strike, such as a high-altitude airburst over the Baltic Sea or an explosion in international waters, to signal its readiness for further escalation.

Second, if regime destabilization occurs due to economic decline or internal unrest, Russia could attempt to reassert control over its sphere of influence through a tactical nuclear strike on a symbolic Western target, such as a Polish logistics hub. This move would be aimed at deterring further Western involvement while reestablishing the Kremlin’s domestic credibility.

Third, the siege of Kaliningrad could eventually lead to battlefield nuclear use. If NATO forces were to encircle Kaliningrad or cut off Russian access to the enclave, Moscow might consider using a tactical nuclear weapon to break the siege. Such a move would test NATO's resolve without directly escalating into a strategic nuclear exchange.

Tactical Nuclear Use as Coercive Signaling

Unlike Cold War-era strategic nuclear doctrines, contemporary Russian nuclear strategy does not envision immediate strikes on major Western capitals. Instead, tactical nuclear use would be designed to shock NATO into inaction while stopping short of full-scale war. Likely options include a high-altitude detonation over the Baltic Sea, a low-yield strike on Gotland (if occupied by NATO), a demonstrative explosion in some remote place in the Arctic, or a strike on a NATO supply depot in Poland or Lithuania. According to the Federation of American Scientists' 2024 assessment, Russia maintains approximately 1,558 non-strategic/tactical nuclear warheads, some of them deployed in Belarus since June 2023.

Each of these options is intended not to win a war outright but to introduce psychological and strategic paralysis within NATO, creating hesitation over further military engagements. By introducing the risk of escalation, Russia would seek to control the tempo of conflict and force NATO into internal debates over the appropriate response. It is worth noticing that the use of tactical nuclear arms as a signal to NATO has been advocated by one of Putin's advisors, the head of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Sergey Karaganov, for the past three years.(1)

In 2023-2024, Karaganov expanded his "preventive nuclear strike" theory; key elements include advocating for nuclear use before any existential threat materializes, demonstrative strikes against NATO members specifically to fracture alliance cohesion, creating a new "nuclear taboo equilibrium" where Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons becomes an accepted element of geopolitical calculation, and emphasis on psychological impact rather than military effectiveness. Karaganov's thinking represents a significant evolution in Russian strategic thought—moving from nuclear weapons as tools of last resort to instruments of active coercion in pursuit of geopolitical objectives.

Technical Analysis of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Effects

Understanding the technical characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons provides critical context for strategic analysis. Tactical nuclear weapons vary significantly in yield and effects. A Russian artillery shell typically has a yield of 1-5 kilotons with a blast radius (5psi) of 0.5-0.9 km. An Iskander warhead has a yield of 10-50 kilotons with a blast radius of 1.3-2.4 km. An air-dropped bomb has a yield of 10-100 kilotons with a blast radius of 1.3-3.1 km. For reference, the Hiroshima bomb had a yield of approximately 15 kilotons with a blast radius of 1.6 km. These physical parameters demonstrate that tactical nuclear weapons, while less destructive than strategic weapons, still cause catastrophic damage over multiple square kilometers.

Modern delivery system accuracy significantly enhances tactical nuclear effectiveness. The Iskander-M has a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 5-7 meters, enabling precise targeting of military assets. The Kalibr cruise missile has a CEP of 3-5 meters, allowing selection of specific buildings/facilities. Legacy artillery has a CEP of 100-300 meters, requiring higher yields for military effectiveness. Improved accuracy enables lower yields while maintaining military effectiveness, potentially lowering the perceived threshold for use.

Beyond immediate blast and radiation, tactical nuclear weapons generate significant electromagnetic effects. A 10kt airburst at 3 km altitude creates a field strength of approximately 50kV/m at ground level. Military-grade EMP hardening typically protects against approximately 25kV/m. Modern military communications would experience 60-80% disruption within 5-8 km radius. Civilian infrastructure would experience 90-100% disruption within 10-15 km radius. These effects extend the weapon's impact far beyond the immediate blast zone, potentially disrupting NATO command and control over a significant area.

Tactical nuclear use would generate significant radiation challenges, including severe radiation exposure within 1-2 km radius for typical tactical yields. Regional medical facilities would be overwhelmed (estimated 1,000-5,000 radiation casualties per tactical detonation). Radiation zones would complicate NATO military response, requiring specialized equipment and creating operational constraints.

Long-term consequences from nuclear fallout would include contamination of up to 1,000km² of agricultural land per detonation, decontamination expenses of €2-10 billion per square kilometer in urban areas, and long-term evacuation requirements for a 15-30km radius around ground burst locations. These long-term effects would create enduring humanitarian and economic challenges well beyond the immediate military impact. Tactical nuclear use would represent a devastating escalation well beyond conventional warfare, despite being below the threshold of strategic nuclear exchange. However, the primary utility of these weapons lies not in their military effectiveness against prepared opponents, but in their psychological impact and coercive potential. The technical reality reinforces the strategic analysis that Russia would view these weapons primarily as tools of psychological coercion rather than battlefield advantage.

The NATO Dilemma: Responding to Limited Nuclear Use

The fundamental weakness of NATO’s position in this scenario is not military, but psychological. Russia’s nuclear strategy operates under the assumption that NATO leaders fear escalation more than Russia does. If Russia were to use a tactical nuclear weapon in a limited, demonstrative manner, the most probable Western response would be diplomatic condemnation accompanied by increased sanctions, rather than immediate military retaliation. While this response would align with NATO’s historical reliance on economic tools as a primary instrument of statecraft, it risks setting a dangerous precedent: permitting nuclear coercion to become a viable strategy for geopolitical gains.

The consequences of inaction could be far-reaching. Sweden and Finland, having recently joined NATO, might reconsider their military commitments due to fears of becoming primary targets in a future nuclear exchange. Germany and France could further their push for greater « European Strategic Autonomy, » which, rather than developing an independent deterrent capability, could instead manifest as appeasement under nuclear blackmail. Meanwhile, Poland and the Baltic states, recognizing the existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed Russia willing to engage in tactical use, would almost certainly demand the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory. This division would fragment NATO between those advocating de-escalation through diplomatic engagement and those insisting on a hardened deterrence posture, potentially leading to paralysis within the alliance.

On the other hand, if NATO opted for a military response, the conflict could escalate unpredictably. A conventional NATO strike on Russian forces—whether targeting missile batteries, command structures, or logistics hubs—might prompt Moscow to double down on nuclear escalation, leading to a protracted regional nuclear standoff. Such a crisis would not necessarily result in immediate strategic nuclear war but would force Western decision-makers into a precarious balancing act: demonstrating resolve without provoking further nuclear use. This dilemma underscores the core strategic challenge NATO faces—whether to deter through overwhelming force or to risk validating limited nuclear aggression by choosing restraint.

Enhanced NATO Response Strategies: Historical Precedents and Evidence

To counter Russia's nuclear coercion, NATO must prepare a range of calibrated response strategies. These strategies can be informed by historical precedents and existing capabilities:

• Enhanced Nuclear Deterrence

NATO could increase the visibility and readiness of U.S. and British nuclear assets deployed in Eastern Europe. This approach would mirror NATO's strategy during the Euromissile Crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the alliance deployed Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to counter Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. This deployment ultimately brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, resulting in the 1987 INF Treaty ( The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). Similarly, following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO increased the visibility of its nuclear exercises, such as the « Steadfast Noon » annual drills, demonstrating its nuclear readiness without direct escalation.

The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review already laid the groundwork for this approach by emphasizing the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems, particularly the B61-12 guided nuclear bomb deployed on F-35 aircraft. This would send an unambiguous signal that any use of nuclear weapons, even tactical, would provoke a proportionate response.

• Cyber and Electronic Warfare Capabilities

Historical precedents for non-nuclear counterforce options include the Stuxnet operation against Iranian nuclear facilities (2010) and Israel's electronic warfare operations against Syrian air defenses (2007). NATO could similarly invest in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russia's nuclear command-and-control infrastructure. The U.S. Cyber Command's « defend forward » doctrine, established in 2018, provides a template for such operations, while NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn has developed frameworks for collective cyber operations.

Evidence from Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates how electronic warfare can significantly disrupt command structures, with Ukrainian forces successfully targeting Russian communications networks and control systems. Applied to nuclear scenarios, these capabilities could disrupt Russia's ability to escalate beyond an initial strike. However, although cyber and AI risks could disrupt command and control, they would also nullify the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that underpins deterrence. Mixed messaging and ambiguous threats increase the danger of miscalculation or unintended escalation

• Non-Nuclear Kinetic Retaliation

NATO could conduct precision airstrikes against Russian military installations outside of core Russian territory. This approach draws on precedents such as Operation El Dorado Canyon against Libya (1986) and various Israeli strikes against Syrian military facilities (2007-present), which demonstrated limited military action without triggering full-scale war.

The 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo also provides a template for limited air operations against a nuclear power (though Russia was significantly weakened at that time). More recently, the 2017 U.S. Tomahawk missile strikes against Syrian government targets showed how precision strikes can signal resolve while minimizing escalation risks.

NATO's current conventional strike capabilities, including the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) with a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers and the naval Tomahawk cruise missile, provide options for standoff strikes against Russian military assets while remaining outside the most dangerous air defense zones. This would reinforce deterrence without breaching the threshold into full nuclear war.

• Economic and Diplomatic Measures

The most developed area of NATO response lies in economic coercion. The unprecedented sanctions regime imposed on Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the West's capacity to inflict severe economic damage. The partial SWIFT ban, asset freezes, and technology export controls established a precedent for rapid financial isolation.

Further escalations could include total SWIFT exclusion, secondary sanctions similar to those imposed on Iran (which reduced Iranian oil exports by over 50% between 2011-2015), and coordinated action against Russian proxy financial networks. The 2014 oil price collapse, partly engineered through Saudi-U.S. coordination, showed how energy markets can be weaponized against petroleum-dependent economies like Russia's.

NATO's diplomatic toolkit could draw on Cold War containment strategies, particularly the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which effectively restricted Soviet access to advanced technologies. A modern variant, focused specifically on military and dual-use technologies, could accelerate regime destabilization and limit Moscow's ability to sustain prolonged confrontation.

• Unity and Political Will: The Critical Factor

NATO's historical effectiveness has always depended on alliance cohesion. During the 1979 dual-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces, NATO faced significant internal opposition but maintained sufficient unity to proceed with missile deployments while simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations. This approach ultimately succeeded.

Conversely, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea revealed fractures in NATO's response capabilities, with divisions between Eastern European states seeking stronger deterrence and Western European nations prioritizing diplomatic engagement. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated improvement in NATO unity but still revealed tensions regarding energy dependence and defense spending commitments.

By maintaining a combination of these strategies, NATO could ensure that Russian nuclear coercion fails as a viable tactic while simultaneously preventing a full-scale nuclear conflict. The challenge, however, remains one of political will. NATO’s long-term success in countering Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship will depend on its ability to present a unified front, resisting internal fractures that might otherwise embolden Moscow to further test the limits of nuclear coercion.

The Russian Gambit: Seeking Stalemate, Not Victory

By 2030, if the Russian regime finds itself militarily weaker and economically stagnant, its primary goal would not be total victory but a frozen conflict scenario. The optimal outcome for Moscow would be the creation of a divided Europe with a neutralized Nordic-Baltic corridor and a consolidated authoritarian Eastern Bloc. This scenario would provide Russia with long-term strategic leverage while ensuring the survival of its ruling elite.

Under such conditions, Russia’s nuclear posture would function as a tool of state survival rather than conquest. Tactical nuclear weapons would not be used to advance into NATO territory but to prevent further Western encroachment on what Russia perceives as its sphere of influence. The key insight here is that such a strategy would not be irrational; rather, it would represent a calculated decision to freeze geopolitical conditions at a point of maximum Russian leverage.

China’s and the United States’ Responses

A limited nuclear exchange in Europe would prompt significant geopolitical recalibrations by both China and the United States.

China, while nominally aligned with Russia against Western dominance, has historically opposed nuclear escalation, fearing its destabilizing effects on global markets and regional stability. Beijing would likely adopt a publicly neutral but privately interventionist stance, urging immediate de-escalation while using diplomatic backchannels to pressure Moscow to restrain further nuclear use. At the same time, China might leverage the crisis to extract economic and political concessions from both Russia and the West, securing greater influence over a weakened Kremlin while positioning itself as a peacemaker and a broker of global stability.

The United States, as NATO’s primary security guarantor, would face an acute strategic dilemma. A nuclear strike by Russia, even at the tactical level, would force Washington to either uphold deterrence credibility through direct retaliation or risk undermining NATO’s security architecture by exercising restraint. While an immediate full-scale nuclear response is unlikely, the U.S. might authorize a proportional retaliatory strike using conventional high-precision weaponry, targeting Russian military assets involved in the attack. Additionally, Washington would accelerate efforts to permanently station nuclear forces in Eastern Europe, reinforcing extended deterrence. Simultaneously, the U.S. would lead the charge on crippling secondary sanctions, isolating Russia from global financial systems and deepening its economic crisis. However, the extent of U.S. military involvement would depend on NATO’s internal cohesion, as any sign of European hesitation could temper American willingness to escalate beyond economic and cyber warfare measures.

The Global South and the Multipolar Alignments

While much of the strategic analysis focuses on NATO, the EU, and other traditional Western alliances, the position of the Global South, particularly major regional powers like India and the BRICS+ coalition, would play a critical role in shaping the legitimacy and impact of any international countermeasures. The ability of the West to rally a broad-based global consensus against nuclear escalation would depend in large part on how these actors respond, both symbolically and materially.

• India’s Strategic Dilemma

India represents a paradigmatic case of geopolitical ambivalence. On the one hand, it maintains deep-rooted historical ties with Russia, including a legacy of defense cooperation that continues to influence its current military posture. As of 2023, approximately 60% of India’s military hardware is of Russian origin, creating a structural dependency that constrains India's room for maneuver. On the other hand, India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States and other Western countries, India has the status of a US defense partner.

Complicating this balancing act is India’s significant increase in energy imports from Russia, which rose thirteenfold between 2021 and 2023. At the same time, India maintains a foreign policy doctrine rooted in strategic autonomy and non-alignment—a tradition that resists external pressure to conform to binary geopolitical camps. In the event of Russian limited nuclear use, India would likely issue a public condemnation to maintain its credibility as a responsible global actor. However, it would stop short of implementing meaningful sanctions or severing ties with Moscow. This dual posture would likely frustrate Western powers seeking unified action, while preserving India’s longer-term strategic flexibility.

• The BRICS+ Cohesion Test

A second key axis of response lies within the BRICS+ grouping, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and newly added members such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. The coalition’s stated ambition of forging an alternative, non-Western security and economic architecture would be fundamentally tested by any act of nuclear aggression by one of its core members.

Several fault lines would emerge in such a scenario. First is the division between nuclear and non-nuclear members. While Russia, China, and India possess nuclear weapons, the rest of the bloc does not, raising questions about the normative coherence of the group. Second, the economic interests of many BRICS+ states—particularly those with growing trade or infrastructure ties to Russia—would likely come into conflict with the global normative taboo against nuclear use. Third, the aspiration to present a unified front against Western hegemony could be severely compromised by the political fallout of Russia's action.

The BRICS+ response is most likely to be fragmented. While approximately 60% of members would probably issue statements condemning the use of nuclear weapons, few would take meaningful punitive measures. This symbolic disapproval without material consequence would expose the limitations of BRICS+ as a geopolitical counterweight and highlight its internal contradictions.

In other words, the response of the Global South—actors like India and the broader BRICS+ coalition—to limited nuclear use by Russia would be defined by a complex interplay of strategic dependence, normative principles, and geopolitical calculations. Rather than galvanizing into a coherent bloc, these actors would likely fracture along lines of interest and ideology. This would not only dilute the moral authority of any Western-led response but also underscore the inherent fragility of emerging multipolar frameworks in times of crisis.

Conclusion

The paradox of 21st-century nuclear strategy is that weak states are more likely to use nuclear weapons than strong ones. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is not a weapon of territorial expansion but of geopolitical paralysis—designed to halt Western advances rather than to initiate an apocalyptic conflict.

If the West continues to conceptualize nuclear weapons solely in the framework of deterrence and total war, it risks failing to recognize the growing role of nuclear coercion as a tool of state survival. All Russian statements from Putin to Medvedev to Karaganov should be interpreted in this context. Russia’s tactical nuclear doctrine is built not on victory, but on making NATO doubt its own willingness to escalate. In this context, the most dangerous outcome is not total war but a long-term strategic paralysis in which nuclear blackmail becomes the defining factor in European security. To counter this, NATO must recognize that deterrence in the XXI century is not just about avoiding war—it is about preventing the normalization of nuclear intimidation as a state survival strategy.

Most of the time, Russia is bluffing as its use of tactical nuclear weapons is primarily a form of coercive signaling, not a genuine desire for nuclear confrontation. Russia believes the West is morally weak. So, the only way to deal with Russia’s nuclear threats effectively is through negotiations from a position of strength. NATO must demonstrate unwavering resolve, avoid showing fear, and maintain unity in the face of these provocations. By doing so, it can ensure that nuclear blackmail does not become a normalized strategy and maintain stability in Europe without falling into the trap of nuclear escalation.

NOTES

(1) https://karaganov.ru/en/sergei-karaganov-nuclear-escalation-may-open-pandora-s-box-but-it-will-also-free-the-world-from-the-500-year-long-western-yoke/ Russia has been modernizing approximately 70% of its nuclear arsenal since 2010, representing a significant investment despite economic constraints. Key developments include the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM (nicknamed "Satan II" by NATO), hypersonic delivery vehicles (Avangard, Kinzhal), and novel systems like the nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik. The significance of this modernization extends beyond mere quantity—Russia's nuclear arsenal now includes systems specifically designed to defeat missile defense systems, increasing the credibility of its deterrence and coercive capabilities